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Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213 (Iowa 2006)
Meyer obtained employment at an IBP plant in Waterloo through a staffing agency and was placed at IBP on October 10, 2000. Meyer remained an employee of the staffing agency until he completed a sixty day probationary period. Meyer first experience pain in his hand at work during this probationary period. His employment with the staffing agency concluded on December 15, 2000. On Monday December 18, 2000 IBP hired Meyer as a regular employee to perform the same job he performed during his probationary period. On December 22 Meyer stopped working and went to the health department at IBP. Meyer quit his job in March 2001. Dr. Knudson diagnosed Meyer with unlar neuropathy of the left elbow and probable carpal tunnel syndrome of the left wrist.
Meyer sought workers’ compensation benefits from IBP. The deputy commissioner and commissioner concluded that Meyer had failed to establish an injury on December 22, 2000, that arose out of and in the course of his employment with IBP relying on uncontradicted medical testimony that the two days that claimant performed work as an IBP employee prior to December 22, 2000 would not, of itself, have produced his left upper extremity hand and elbow conditions.
The Iowa Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the term “arising out of “employment. The term “arising out of” employment means there must be a “causal relationship between the employment and the injury.” Koehler Elec. V. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2000). The “arising out of” element requires that the injury be a natural incident of the work meaning the injury must be a “ ‘rational consequence of the hazard connected with such employment.’ ” Id. At 3-4 (quoting 2800 Corp v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1995)). “ ‘In other words, the injury must not have coincidentally occurred while at work, but must in some way be caused by or related to the working environment or the conditions of . . . employment.’ ” Id. At 3 (quoting Miedema, 551 N.W.2d at 311); see 1 Larson at 9-1 (“Injuries arising out of risks or conditions personal to the claimant do not arise out of the employment unless the employment contributes to the risk or aggravates the injury.”).
In addition to the requirement of an injury, the court has said that our workers’ compensation act primarily requires the worker to establish: (1) an employer-employee relationship at the time of injury, (2) an injury arising out of and the course of employment, and (3) the disability . . . proximately caused by the injury. The court recognizes that proximate cause between the disability and injury is another requirement of compensation, but it is not directly implicated by section 85.3(1). Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 220, footnote 2 citing to Freeman v. Luppes Transp. Co., 227 N.W.2d 143, 148. (Iowa 2006). The injury must proximately cause the disability but it is not accurate to say that the employment must proximately cause the injury. The injury need only arise out of employment, a less onerous standard than the proximate cause standard.
The Supreme Court reversed the commissioner stating that Meyer did not have to prove that the two days of employment was the cause of the injury but was only required to prove that a condition of his employment increased the risk of injury. The court noted that Meyer performed the same type of work for IBP and his prior employer and that the work involved highly repetitive motions which are known to lead to carpal tunnel syndrome or cumulative trauma injury. The court further found that the type of work that Meyer performed for IBP place him at greater risk of carpal tunnel syndrome and even though he only worked for IBP for two days the the type of injury he sustained was a rational consequence of a the work he performed for IBP. The court concluded that there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the injury was manifested before or after Meyer started working for IBP and the commissioner never made any findings on that issue. The matter was remanded back to the commissioner to decide the date of manifestation.
Posted by Richard G. Book on February 11, 2007 7:14 PM
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