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Winnebago Industries and Sentry Insurance vs Haverly, 727 N.W.2d 567, (Iowa 2006)
In 1992 Haverly sustained a work related back injury and in 1997 entered into an agreement for settlement. Winnebago provided ongoing medical care including surgery. On November 7, 2000 Haverly went to the doctor complaining of increased back pain. He sought medical care from Dr. David Beck who recommended surgery.
In March of 2002 Haverly filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits alleging that a work related back injury occurred on November 7, 2000. Winnebago responded that any injury sustained on Novembe 7, 2000 related to the 1992 injury and at most, caused a temporary aggravation of his preexisting back condition.
After Winnebago would not authorized the surgery recommended by Dr. Beck Haverly filed a petition for alternate medical care on May 17, 200. The petition alleged a Novem ber 7, 2000 injury dated and requested that the surgery be provided by Winnebago. In its answer to the petition for alternate medical care and at the hearing Winnebago did not dispute liability for the injury. The petition for alternate medical care was granted and Winnebago was ordered to provide the surgery.
At the hearing on the claim for benefits the deputy commissioner determined that issue of liability for the November 7 injury had been previously litigated in the alternate medical care proceeding and that this prior decision was, therefore, res judicata on the issue of liability. On appeal the commissioner affirmed stating that the alternate medical care proceeding was res judicate on the issue of liability for benefits. The commissioner further stated that even if issue preclusion did not preclude Winnibago from litigating the issue, the record amply demonstrate that Haverly suffered a new injury on November 7, 2000.
Winnebago filed a petition for judicial review. The district court reversed ruling that issue preclusion did not apply because the issue of liability had not been raised and litigated in the prior action. The district court found that Winnebago’s admission of liability in the alternate medical care proceeding was an admission of liability for medical care only not an admission of liability for a new injury. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court on further review agreed that the admission of liability in the alternate medical care proceeding was not res judicata and was not the law of the case but concluded that Winnebago was judicially estopped from denying liability because it conceded that issue in the alternate care proceeding. The issue of judicial estoppel was not raised by Haverly but instead was mentioned and rejected by the district court. The supreme court stated that because judicial estoppel is intended to protect the integrity of the fact-finding process by administrative agencies and courts, the issue may be properly raised by the courts, even at the appellate stage, on their own motion.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding. It is a common sense rule designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing deliberately inconsistent and potentially misleading assertions from being successfully urged in succeeding tribunals. The doctrine is properly limited in its application to cases involving privity with, or prejudice to, the party invoking the doctrine. Another fundamental feature of the doctrine is the requirement of proof that the inconsistent position has been successfully asserted in the prior tribunal. Without such proof, “application of the rule is unwarranted because no risk of inconsistent, misleading results exist
Posted by Richard G. Book on April 23, 2007 6:15 AM
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